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Abstract
In this paper we model taxpayers reactions to the possibility of either
reporting income as usual and running the risk of an audit or reporting a
“cutoff” income and paying a threshold tax that gives the certainty of not
being audited. Models of this kind already discussed in the literature as-
sume that taxpayers are risk neutral. We depart from this stream of research
by assuming instead that taxpayers have a Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) utility function and differ in relative risk aversion coefficient and in
income. The government can rely upon a signal in order to assess the income
class to which the taxpayer belongs and fix the threshold tax. Our main re-
sult is that, within each class, the threshold tax is paid by taxpayers whose
relative risk aversion lies in a given interval. Taxpayers with high risk aversion
and relatively low income file their report as usual. Unlike analogous models
under risk neutrality, relatively rich taxpayers with low risk aversion might
not pay the threshold tax as well. An equity problem arises.
JEL Classification Numbers: H260, D890, K420.
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1 Introduction
Under a cutoff policy the Tax Administration audits, with a given probability,
each taxpayer who reports an income that falls short of a given threshold; if
the income report instead meets or is above the threshold, it is not audited.
If taxpayers are risk-neutral, and the expected sanction for tax evasion is
large enough, the effects of the cutoff rule are that taxpayers whose income
(and thus whose tax1) is lower than the threshold pay their due tax and risk
audits, while those who owe a tax equal to or higher than the threshold pay the
threshold tax and avoid audits. Overall payments made by taxpayers are non
decreasing in income. This approach has been examined in many respects in
the literature (see e.g. [11], [13],[5], [12], and, for a generalization, [3]), mainly
as an efficient strategy in agency models in which the Tax Administration as a
principal can commit to a given audit policy. A cutoff property has, however,
been shown to hold also for equilibrium in the taxation game under given
conditions [7].
According to the principal-agent approach, the cutoff policy may entail
efficiency gains, as it secures savings in terms of audit costs that might exceed
the revenue losses in taxation. The mechanism has characteristics similar to
those of plea-bargaining in criminal proceedings2, as taxpayers who pay the
threshold tax can be assimilated to those who, by pleading guilty, receive
a milder treatment than the due one according to general rules. As in plea-
bargaining under risk-neutrality, those who accept the threshold offer are those
who would receive a harsher treatment under general rules if the government
possessed full information. There might thus be an equity/efficiency trade-off.
In taxation the cutoff rule has been criticized from an equity point of view, as
it introduces a regressive bias, because taxpayers payments strictly increase in
income only until the threshold level. However, an approach based on audit
classes, as suggested by Scotchmer [13], might countervail this effect.
1For the sake of simplicity the income tax is described as a function of reported income,
disregarding possible differences between reported (gross) income and net taxable income
due to exemptions, deductions etc.
2 See Grossman and Katz [6].
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Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau [5], in their conclusions about the cut-
off policy, put at the top of the agenda for future research the relaxation
of the risk neutrality assumption. Since then, however, as far as we know,
their suggestion has been largely neglected. In this paper we try to address
the problem, even by adopting a partial equilibrium perspective in order to
overcome the technical difficulties involved.
When taxpayers are risk averse, the cutoff system can perform a role which
is by definition excluded under risk neutrality: that of collecting risk premia
for the insurance against audits provided by the cutoff3 . When the tax rate
and the enforcement parameters are such that the expected yield of tax eva-
sion is positive, this characteristic may render the cutoff policy profitable even
disregarding the benefits in terms of reducing the number of audits to run. In
view of the exploitation of this opportunity, we assume that the Tax Admin-
istration, relying upon a signal, forms taxpayers classes, and credibly sets a
threshold tax for each one, by adding a risk premium to the expected payment
of the class under general rules. We assume that taxpayers are informed about
these thresholds and we focus upon the taxpayers’ reaction to such offers.
The signal received by the Tax Administration refers to the optimal report
which the taxpayer would choose to submit under general rules (leaving the
cutoff offer aside), instead than to the taxpayer’s true income, as e.g. in
Scotchmer [13]. Since the Tax Administration has a much larger experience
in receiving income reports than in assessing true incomes through audits, it
seems likely that it should more easily exploit information pertaining to the
former than to the latter in order to shape the cutoff policy.
We aim at capturing in the model some features of the practice of tax
enforcement. In many countries only a minor share of controls is random,
while most are based upon procedures (for the United States, see [2]) that
directly or indirectly refer to predictors of a reference income (and hence tax)
which is compared to the reported one, for deciding whether to start the
control. Thus the taxpayer who meets the tax payment expected from him on
the basis of personal and economic characteristics (the threshold tax in the
3For this approach, see also [4].
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model), does not run the risk of being audited.
The assumption that taxpayers are perfectly informed about the cutoff
system is fully realistic when the threshold tax offer takes an explicit form,
like in the FATOTA (Fixed Amount of Taxes or Tax Audit) system analyzed
by Chu [4], in which the taxpayer must opt for the FAT if she wants to insure
against tax audits. The assumption is quite reasonable also for countries in
which the Tax Administration publishes reference guides for assessing income
on the basis of economic indicators, or largely resorts to the cooperation of
employees, business and professional organizations, which perform a filter role
in assessing incomes and collecting reports (examples can be found in France,
Italy and Spain). Even in countries, like the US, in which the IRS guards the
secret about the details of the mechanisms that trigger controls, taxpayers
gain some information by ex-post observation of the IRS behavior4. The
topic thus seems relevant, as the cutoff approach represents a policy option
that some countries, more or less thoroughly, adopt and others might find it
profitable to take into consideration.
In this paper we analyze one component of the problem of a cutoff policy
under risk aversion: the taxpayers reaction to the threshold tax offer. This is
a limited but not trivial task, as we assume that taxpayers are heterogenous
in terms of income and relative risk aversion. Hence, for given parameters
that characterize the tax system (tax function, penalty and probability of
control), a given tax report that does not meet the threshold may hide many
possible tax evasion levels. Our model aims at characterizing those taxpayers
who choose to pay the threshold tax, in comparison with those who refuse it,
in terms of income and relative risk aversion.
The main result of the paper is that, when taxpayers have a CRRA utility
function, the threshold tax is paid by an intermediate interval of taxpayers.
Taxpayers with low income relative to their class and high risk aversion file
their report as usual and evade only a small amount of their due tax. Unlike
4We have found on the Internet free-of-charge sites that provide statistics about factors
that increase the audit probability and, on the basis of the declaration one submits, assess
the audit probability.
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in models under risk neutrality, rich taxpayers with low risk aversion might
also refuse to pay the threshold tax. This fact gives rise to equity problems
within each class, while among classes vertical equity, in a mild sense that will
be clarified in Section 5, is being preserved. The taxpayers reaction takes at
any rate a clearly predictable pattern, which can form the basis for assessing
the equity-efficiency trade-off of the cutoff policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the taxpayer’s
problem with reference to both the optimal income report and the conditions
needed for the acceptance of a cutoff proposal. In Section 3 we characterize,
in terms of both true income and relative risk aversion, those who pay the
threshold tax, within each class. A numerical example referred to a single class
is presented in Section 4. In Section 5 the general properties of a cutoff policy
based on classes are characterized. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 6,
while the Appendix contains most of the proofs.
2 Modelling the Taxpayer’s Problem
Let us study the taxpayer’s optimal report, with reference only to general
tax rules, and setting the cutoff policy aside for the moment. It is assumed
that the taxpayer’s true income is a random variable bw, whose realization
w is known only by himself. The utility that the taxpayer enjoys out of her
income w is assumed to be of the standard CRRA form, with constant relative
risk-aversion coefficient α:
u (w) =
w1−α − 1
1− α . (1)
In this class we also include the case α = 1 by taking the limit of the right
hand side in (1) for α→ 1, obtaining u(w) = lnw.
A proportional tax system5 is considered: the income tax is given by
t(y) = ty, where y denotes the reported income and 0 < t < 1. We assume
5A version considering a progressive tax and a sanction linear in concealed income,
available from the authors upon request, leads to the same main results of the present
paper and is much more cumbersome.
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also that the sanction to be paid in case of audit6 is proportional to the
amount of the evaded tax:
S (w, y) = (1 + s)t (w − y) , (2)
where s > 0 is a penalty rate.
As we rule out rewards to honest taxpayers by assumption7, a taxpayer will
report y ≤ w, where w > 0 denotes the true income. A rational taxpayer who
earned a true income w will choose to report the income y∗ that maximizes
her expected utility
Eu(y) =
(1− p) (w − ty)1−α + p [w − ty − (1 + s)t (w − y)]1−α − 1
1− α (3)
with respect to y, where 0 < p < 1 is the probability of detection. Note that,
by considering u(w) = lnw when α = 1, Eu(y) is well defined for all α > 0
and for all feasible y.
The feasible set contains values for y that satisfy
(1 + s)t (w − y) < w − ty. (4)
In other words, we need to assume that the taxpayer can always bear the
loss in case of detected evasion. Inequality (4) defines a lower bound for the
feasible reported income
mw =
[(1 + s) t− 1]w
ts
such thatmw < y. Since we are interested in a strictly positive income report,
we shall assume that
(1 + s) t > 1.
6We stick to the standard assumption that detection of tax evasion occurs with proba-
bility 1 whenever the tax report is false and an audit is run.
7This is also a standard assumption, even if the theory of optimal auditing provides
reasons in favor of rewards to audited honest risk-averse taxpayers (see Mookherjee and
Png [10]).
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This implies that sanctions are large enough to exclude full evasion8. There-
fore, the feasible set of values for the reported income y is the interval (mw, w] ⊂
R++.
In accordance with empirical evidence, we assume that the tax system
parameters have values such that cheating in reporting income has a positive
expected return. In other words, the expected sanction is assumed to be less
than the expected gain for each dollar invested in tax evasion: sp < 1 − p.
Hence, also the case of full compliance, y = w, is ruled out, as it is readily seen
by noting that the limit of the marginal expected utility [Eu(y)]0 as y → w−
is negative whenever sp < 1− p.
Since, on the other hand, limy→m+w [Eu(y)]
0 = +∞ and Eu(y) is strictly
concave over (mw, w) for all α > 0, there exists a unique value mw < y∗ <
w that maximizes the expected utility, which is completely characterized in
terms of F.O.C. applied to (3). That is,
w − ty∗ − (1 + s)t (w − y∗)
w − ty∗ = r
1
α (5)
where
0 < r =
ps
1− p < 1.
By solving (5) for y∗ it turns out that the optimal reported income is a
fixed share of the taxpayer’s true income w, that depends on the risk aversion
coefficient α:
y∗ =
(1 + s)t+ r
1
α − 1
t
³
s+ r
1
α
´ w. (6)
Note that a larger risk aversion implies a larger share.
2.1 Introducing a Cutoff
For simplicity of presentation we assume in this Section that the Tax Admin-
istration is able to exactly identify all the taxpayers whose optimal reported
8The literature that considers optimal income report under risk aversion has routinely
focussed upon strictly positive reports, see, e.g., Allingham and Sandmo [1].
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income is y∗, independently on the actual submission of the report. This
assumption shall be relaxed in Section 5.
For future use, we note that the government can make some inference
about the true income w of taxpayers whose optimal reported income is y∗.
By solving equation (5) for w, when y∗ is reported, we obtain a relation
expressing the true income of (optimizing) taxpayers as a function of their
relative risk aversion α:
w (α) =
³
r
1
α + s
´
ty∗
r
1
α + (1 + s) t− 1
(7)
As can be easily checked, the function w (α) in (7) is strictly decreasing.
We assume also that, in order to implement the cutoff policy, the Tax
Administration, which is risk neutral, sets a threshold tax that amounts to
C(y∗) = ty∗ + x, where the premium x is strictly positive and is aimed at
cashing the expected value of the sanction plus the risk premium.
The expected reactions of the taxpayer are as follows. She will accept
the offer if she is at least indifferent as whether to pay the requested amount
C(y∗) or to pay only ty∗ and risk an audit. Thus, for a given premium x > 0,
in order to choose to pay the threshold tax the following condition must be
met:
[w − (ty∗ + x)]1−α
1− α ≥
(1− p) (w − ty∗)1−α
1− α (8)
+
p [w − ty∗ − (1 + s)t (w − y∗)]1−α
1− α ,
where the additive constants − (1− α)−1 have already been dropped from
both sides.
By considering jointly the optimal condition (7) and the threshold condi-
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tion (8), we are led to the following system:



w =
³
r
1
α + s
´
ty∗
r
1
α + (1 + s) t− 1
(w − ty∗ − x)1−α
1− α ≥
(1− p) (w − ty∗)1−α
1− α
+
p [w − ty∗ − (1 + s)t (w − y∗)]1−α
1− α
(9)
where the reported income y∗ and premium x are given and α and w are the
unknowns. The first equation of system (9) links the taxpayer’s true income w
to y∗ according to (5). The second equation is the weak preference condition
for paying the threshold tax instead of reporting y∗ and risking an audit. All
pairs (α,w) solving system (9), characterize in terms of relative risk-aversion
α and true income w the subset of taxpayers whose optimal reported income
is y∗ and who prefer to pay the threshold tax instead of optimally filing a tax
report and risking audits.
2.2 Who pays the threshold tax?
By plugging the first equality in system (9) into the second inequality, we
obtain a single inequality where the unknown is the sole variable α:
1
1− α
³
A−Br 1α
´1−α
≥ 1
1− α
·
1− p+ p
³
r
1
α
´1−α¸
, (10)
where A, B and r are constants defined by
A = 1− [(1 + s) t− 1]x
(1 + s) (1− t) ty∗ (11)
B =
x
(1 + s) (1− t) ty∗ (12)
r =
ps
1− p. (13)
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Since (1 + s) t > 1, A < 1; moreover, B > 0 as long as x > 0. To study
inequality (10), we need also 0 < x < (1− t) y∗ to hold. That is, the premium
x must be smaller than the disposable income when tax evasion is small, i.e.,
y∗ is very close to w. Note that this bound implies 0 < B < A < 1, and thus
also 0 < A − B < A − Br < 1 holds. Therefore, inequality (10) - and thus
system (9) - is equivalent to(
f(α) ≥ 0 if 0 < α ≤ 1
f(α) ≤ 0 if α ≥ 1.
(14)
where f : R++ → R is defined by
f(α) =
³
A−Br 1α
´1−α
− p
³
r
1
α
´1−α
− (1− p). (15)
Note that f(α) is well defined for all α > 0 and is C∞. Moreover, f(1) = 0.
However, since the original system (9) is defined for α 6= 1, it is readily under-
stood from system (14) that a sufficient condition for a nonempty solution set,
that is, a positive measure of taxpayers (described by a non trivial interval of
values of relative risk aversion α) opting for the cutoff, is that f crosses the
horizontal axis from above at α = 1.
Function f defined in (15) does not allow for a closed form solution of (14).
Hence, we shall characterize solutions of a slightly simplified system and under
some further conditions. Specifically, we shall use a suitable lower bound l < f
for 0 < α < 1, while for α ≥ 1 we will be able to characterize solutions only
for a subclass of models. However, we shall see that our technique covers the
most meaningful cases.
We now decompose function f(α) in three parts in order to single out the
most problematic ones and replace them with a suitable approximation. Let
φ(α) =
³
A−Br 1α
´1−α
ϕ(α) = −p
³
r
1
α
´1−α
.
Clearly f = φ+ ϕ− (1− p). Now define
ψ(α) = 1− ln(A−Br)(α− 1)
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and
l(α) =
(
ψ(α) + ϕ(α)− (1− p) for 0 < α < 1
f(α) for α ≥ 1.
We shall characterize solutions of the system(
l(α) ≥ 0 if 0 < α ≤ 1
l(α) ≤ 0 if α ≥ 1.
(16)
The construction of function l is motivated as follows. Since function φ is
not well behaved over (0, 1), being neither convex nor concave over the whole
interval, we substitute it with the convex lower bound (A−Br)1−α, then we
further lower it by taking its first order approximation centered on α = 1
(Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that ψ(α) < φ(α)). Thus, l turns out to
be a lower bound9 for f on the interval (0, 1), with an improved (linearized)
shape for component φ in f ; while, by construction, l = f for all α ≥ 1.
Therefore, solutions of (16) are a subset of solutions of (14); in particular,
some points in the “left-side” solution set of (14), a subset of interval (0, 1), are
lost through our approximation. Note that, by construction, l0(1) = f 0(1) =
− ln(A−Br) + p ln r.
3 The Main Result
The following result completely describes the solution set of our simplified
model, system (16). Following the discussion in the previous sections, we
need to restrict the range of the parameters of the model, as summarized
below.
A. 1 The sanction rate s and the tax rate t satisfy
(1 + s) t > 1.
9A lower (as opposed to a higher) bound is the basis for prudentially assessing the
government revenue under a cutoff policy.
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A. 2 The premium x satisfies
0 < x < (1− t) y∗.
Moreover, the following restriction is necessary in the proof of Proposition
1.
A. 3 Probability of detection p and the sanction rate s satisfy
r =
ps
1− p ≤ e
−2.
Assumption A.3 is purely technical. The idea behind the proof of Propo-
sition 1, however, can be easily replicated through a symmetrical argument
to obtain analogous results for the case r > e−2.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions A.1, A.2 and A.3 hold true. Then the
solution set S ⊆ R++ of system (16) has the following properties.
i) If A.3 holds with equality, then S is a nonempty interval10 : S = [α, α],
with 0 ≤ α < 1 < α < +∞, if and only if
x <
(1 + s) (1− t) ty∗
(1 + s) t− (1− e−2)
¡
1− e−2p
¢
. (17)
ii) If A.3 holds with strict inequality, a sufficient condition for S to be non-
empty and of the form S = [α,α] with 0 ≤ α < 1 < α < +∞, is the
following:
x ≤ (1 + s) (1− t) ty
∗
(1 + s) t− (1− e−2)
(
1−
·
1 + p (ln r)
µ
ln r
2
+ 1
¶¸ 2
2+ln r
)
= x.
(18)
iii) If
x >
(1 + s) (1− t) ty∗
(1 + s) t− (1− r)
·
1− exp
µ
4e−2p
r ln r
¶¸
, (19)
then S is empty.
10To be precise S = (0, α] whenever α = 0, since Eu(·) is not defined for α = 0.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 characterizes the solution set S of system (16) by focussing
on the properties of the function l. If A.3 holds with equality, then l(α) =
ψ(α) + ϕ(α)− (1− p) turns out to be strictly concave over (0, 1) and strictly
convex over [1,+∞), and has a unique flex-point at α = 1. In order to have
a non-trivial solution of system (16) we need l(α) to cross the abscissa from
above, or l0(1) to be negative, which is the same as condition (17). If A.3
holds with strict inequality, the flex point of l(α) is at some value c > 1. We
extend the same argument of case (i) by constructing a function h(α) that is
as similar as much as possible to l but is better shaped than l over the interval
(1, c) where the required convexity property of l cannot be verified directly.
Condition (18) now ensures that h(α) crosses the abscissa from above. Finally
condition (19) characterizes the case in which l crosses the abscissa at α = 1
from below and thus the solution set S is empty11.
3.1 Discussion
Proposition 1 is only theoretically meaningful: it provides the intrinsic shape
of the solution set of a model that approximates (14). It basically states
that taxpayers who pay the threshold tax, if any, have a relative risk aversion
coefficient belonging to some interval which contains 1. According to the
length of this interval, the following three cases can occur.
1. If x → 0 then the cutoff tend to be accepted by all the taxpayers.
This case is degenerate as it would not provide extra revenue for the
government.
2. If α = 0 and α > 1, relatively rich taxpayers with low risk aversion, i.e.
with α ≤ α, pay the threshold tax, while relatively poor ones with high
11Clearly, in this last case, in order to let assumption A. 2 to be satisfied,
(1 + s) (1− t) ty∗
(1 + s) t− (1− r)
·
1− exp
µ
4e−2p
r ln r
¶¸
< (1− t) y∗
must hold. We shall see in the example provided in the Section 4 that this is the case for
reasonable values of all parameters.
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risk aversion, that is with α > α, do not accept the cutoff. The latter
prefer to submit their optimal report y∗, which, by (7), conceals only a
relatively small income amount, and risk audits. This finding parallels a
similar result about the effect of the cutoff rule under risk neutrality. In
our case, the result can be explained as follows. As reported income y∗
approaches true income w for very risk averse taxpayers, the expected
sanction decreases, while the increase in risk premium under a CRRA
utility function does not countervail the former effect.
3. If α > 0 and α > 1, besides the reaction already discussed in the last
point, the cutoff is refused also by taxpayers with a risk aversion coeffi-
cient below some lower bound α < 1, whose optimal income report y∗,
again by (7), conceals a relatively large income amount. These taxpay-
ers too prefer to risk audits instead of paying the threshold tax. Hence
there are two groups of taxpayers who refuse the cutoff, one character-
ized by relatively high and the other by relatively low true income. This
finding is new and does not correspond to the results reached under the
assumption of risk neutrality. It deserves further investigation which
will be tackled separately in the next Paragraph.
One might also consider the possibility of a refusal of the cutoff only by
relatively rich and low risk averse taxpayers, that is a lower bound α that
remains strictly positive while α → ∞. However, this is ruled out by the
consideration that a premium x→ 0 is needed to ensure that taxpayers with
risk aversion α→∞ accept the cutoff; in this case also taxpayers with α→ 0
would accept it.
3.2 The Reaction of Rich Taxpayers with LowRisk Aver-
sion
The refusal of paying the threshold tax by rich taxpayers with low risk aver-
sion arises under given conditions, as the following proposition shows. For
simplicity, we consider only the general case (ii) of Proposition 1, that is when
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assumption A.3 holds with strict inequality and the solution set S = [α, α] is
nonempty.
Proposition 2 Under A.1 and A.2, assume that A.3 holds with strict in-
equality. Moreover, assume that s ≥ 1. If the tax rate t is such that
(1 + s) t >
1− p
¡
1− e−2
¢
−
£
1 + p (ln r)
¡
ln r
2 + 1
¢¤ 2
2+ln rn
1− p−
£
1 + p (ln r)
¡
ln r
2 + 1
¢¤ 2
2+ln r
o , (20)
then there exist values of premium x such that α > 0. Specifically, α > 0 for
all values of x satisfying
p (1 + s) (1− t) ty∗
(1 + s) t− 1 < x ≤ x, (21)
where x is defined in (18).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that for a large enough sanction rate there exist
(small) values of α - corresponding to high values of true income w - charac-
terizing a group of taxpayers who do not pay the threshold tax.
Let us provide an intuitive explanation of the possible refusal of paying the
threshold tax by rich taxpayers. For any optimal reported income y∗, there
is an upper bound to the values that the true taxpayer’s income can assume.
Since 0 < r < 1, by taking the limit in (7) for α→ 0+, one gets:
lim
α→0+
w (α) =
sty∗
(1 + s) t− 1 = w < +∞. (22)
The upper bound w decreases in the sanction rate (1 + s) t. Hence, when the
sanction rate is high, and thus w is low, it is possible that the requested x
is too large relatively to the expected sanction plus the (about nil in relative
terms) risk premium the agent is willing to pay, thus discouraging the payment
of the threshold tax.
To summarize: since taxpayers with a CRRA utility function cannot bear
ruin, even at low values of the risk aversion coefficient they might not bet very
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large sums in tax evasion12, while on the other hand their low risk aversion
coefficient might imply the refusal of an insurance offer. Proposition 2 shows
the conditions under which a high enough value of the sanction rate (1 + s) t
can originate this effect.
4 A Numerical Example
Let us study an example, with the following values of parameters: t = 0.44,
p = 0.01, s = 1.7 and y∗ = 1000. Assumptions A.1 and A.3 are verified since
(1 + s) t = 1.188 > 1 and r ' 0.017 < 0.135 ' e−2. In particular, condition
A.3 holds with strict inequality and thus parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1
will be relevant.
The upper bound for x in condition (18) turns out to be x ' 80, which
clearly satisfies assumption A.2. Therefore any fixed premium that satisfies
x ≤ 80 produces a nonempty interval [α, α] of relative risk aversion coefficients
characterizing agents who pay the threshold tax. For example, with x = 50,
the interval has α ' 0.357 and α ' 5.645 as its extremes, as shown in figure
1 (a). These two values, through (7), correspond to a minimum true income
w ' 1426 (corresponding to α ' 5.64) and a maximum true income w '
3946 (corresponding to α ' 0.64), which imply an evasion (in terms of share
of concealed income when y∗ is reported) of around 30% and around 75%
respectively.
The true income of taxpayers reporting y∗ = 1000 lies in the interval
(1000, 3979). The lower value refers to full compliance, while the higher one
to the maximal evasion compatible with limited liability, as a taxpayer with
a true income of 3979 who reports 1000 would receive zero net income in case
of detection.
In view of inequality (20), to observe some rich and low risk-averse tax-
payers who refuse to pay the threshold tax, the sanction rate (1 + s) t must be
such that (1 + s) t & 1.0467, given the values of the other parameters shown
above, a condition which is met in this example as (1 + s) t = 1.188.
12That is, the concealed amount cannot encompass w − y∗.
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The lower bound for x expressed by condition (19) in (iii) of Proposition 1
is x ' 242, hence any fixed premium that satisfies 242 < x < 560 = (1− t) y∗
is in the range of assumption A.2 and produces an empty solution set. This
means that function l is strictly increasing and crosses the x axis at the unique
point α = 1, as is shown in figure 1 (b) for x = 292.
For any value between x ' 80 and x ' 242 Proposition 1 cannot be
applied and, in principle, nothing can be said. The sufficient condition (18)
fails to detect the existence of a nonempty interval of values of relative risk
aversion coefficients even if such an interval exists for some values of parameter
x ∈ [x, x]. We have worked out, however, many numerical counterexamples
which support the robustness of Proposition 1; these counterexamples show
that Proposition 1 proves to be useless only in special cases where the possible
interval is extremely tiny, a circumstance that does not seem very appealing
for the government. Note also that the error on the lower bound α introduced
by considering the approximated model (16) in place of (14) affects only the
side on the left of α = 1 and seems negligible.
5 Classes
When the Tax Administration faces a taxpayer whose optimal reported income
is y∗, thanks to (22), it can infer that the true taxpayer’s income w belongs to
the open interval (y∗, w), which we define from now on as a taxpayers’ class. In
other words, in the sequel each taxpayer is identified by the tax Administration
through her class (y∗, w), or, equivalently, through her reported income y∗.
We do not tackle here the choice problem of designing an optimal threshold
tax offer function specifying the cutoff assigned to each class, that the Tax
Administration might select having in mind some social or governmental goal.
We simply assume that some basic threshold tax value is chosen for the bottom
class, while for the upper classes the threshold tax is proportionally adjusted
with respect to the optimal reported income.
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5.1 A Proportional Tax System
Let V (y∗0) = ty
∗
0+x0 be the cutoff payment chosen by the Tax Administration
for the bottom class represented by a reported income y∗0 . For values of
reported income y∗ larger than y∗0 we assume that the premium increases
accordingly, that is,
x(y∗) =
y∗
y∗0
x0. (23)
Thus, the threshold tax requested from a taxpayer whose optimal reported
income is y∗ is now
V (y∗) = ty∗ + x(y∗) = ty∗ +
y∗
y∗0
x0. (24)
This approach not only seems coherent with a proportional tax system,
but it allows for an important extension of Proposition 1 to all taxpayers’
classes.
Proposition 3 Under A.1, A.2 and A.3, suppose that x0 verifies either (i)
or (ii) or (iii) of Proposition 1. Then also the premium x(y∗) defined in (23)
satisfies (i) or (ii) or (iii) of Proposition 1 for any reported income y∗.
Proof. It is immediately seen that inequalities (17), (18) and (19) remain
unchanged if the threshold tax V (y∗) is defined as in (24), as both sides of
the inequalities vary proportionally to y∗.
Proposition 4 characterizes the tax system under the previously described
cutoff policy with reference to vertical equity.
Proposition 4 The revenue collected by the Tax Administration from each
taxpayer with risk aversion coefficient α, turns out to be proportional to her
true income w, with a factor of proportionality that depends on α itself and
is lower than the legislated tax rate t.
Proof. We must establish the result separately for taxpayers accepting
the cutoff and for those who refuse it.
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For the former group, Proposition 3 ensures that the interval of α values is
the same in each class. As V (y∗) is proportional to y∗, while y∗ is a constant
share of w for each given α (recall (6) in Section 2), the assert is proven with
reference to these taxpayers.
For each taxpayer who refuses the cutoff, the expected payment in taxes
and fines is
ty∗ + p(1 + s)t(w − y∗). (25)
By substituting (6) into (25) proportionality of the expected payment to w
for each given α is readily seen.
The factor of proportionality is lower than the legislated tax rate for all the
taxpayers, as, on the basis of the second inequality in (9), u (w − ty∗ − x) =
Eu(y∗) > u (w − tw), and hence w− ty∗ − x > w− tw, while y∗ < w, that is,
ty∗ + x < tw.
Proposition 4 states that, whenever income classes are considered, the
actual tax system turns out to be vertically equitable in a mild sense, as
there is a proportional relationship between expected total payments and true
income, but only among taxpayers who have the same relative risk aversion.
Since taxpayers with the same true income but different relative risk aversion
pay different amounts, horizontal equity is at any rate violated. Moreover,
specific equity problems are raised by the cutoff policy. On the one hand,
taxpayers who accept the cutoff pay larger sums than under a regime without
a cutoff, thus providing a larger contribution to government revenue. On the
other hand, they gain from voluntarily insuring against controls, and thus in
utility terms they are favored in comparison with other taxpayers who do not
receive a suitable offer.
5.2 Signals and Classes
In a more realistic scenario, the Tax Administration does not know each tax-
payer’s y∗ before the actual submission of the report. In order to formulate
the threshold tax offer independently of the report’s availability, some cor-
related variables such as profession, age, geographical location, etc., might
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be exploited. In the followings it is shown that the implementation of the
cutoff policy under imperfect information, when the Tax Administration only
receives a signal, can have the same effects already discussed for the case of
perfect information about y∗.
Fix a given optimal reported income y∗ (that is, consider a taxpayer be-
longing to the class (y∗, w)), and assume that the Tax Administration ob-
serves some signal z associated to y∗ (that is, the signal produced by that
specific taxpayer). Following Scotchmer [13], let us assume that the sig-
nal is uniformly distributed over the interval [k0y∗, k1y∗] with density h(z |
y∗) = [(k1 − k0) y∗]−1, where k0 and k1 are multiplicative factors13 such that
0 ≤ k0 < k1.
Under this setting, we assume that the government is only able to put the
taxpayer within a fork of optimal reported income, and the taxpayer is equally
likely to be put in classes k0y∗, k1y∗, or in all intermediate classes. Since the
threshold tax offer is adjusted to the optimal reported income as perceived
by the Tax Administration, the taxpayer can receive a better or worse offer
according to the class to which she is assigned; e.g., she could refuse paying
the threshold tax in class k1y∗ while accepting it if put in a lower class.
The expected payment of the taxpayer with risk aversion coefficient α and
reporting the optimal income y∗ depends on whether the amount requested
for the cutoff by the Tax Administration satisfies the second inequality in
system (9), or, in view of Proposition 1, on whether α belongs to the interval
[α, α]. However, the interval [α, α] depends on the amount V (z) requested
for the cutoff, which, in turn, depends on the signal z perceived by the Ad-
ministration. Therefore it is useful to relabel the extremes of the interval as
functions of V (z): α [V (z)] and α [V (z)], which also stresses dependence of
the interval [α, α] on the signal z. Two cases are possible.
13This assumption implies that the range of possible percentage mistake in assessing y∗ is
constant. Following Scotchmer [13], one could assume instead that the signal is distributed
on the interval [y∗ − a, y∗ + a], where a > 0 is some additive constant, which, however,
implies that the percentage error shrinks as y∗ increases.
Note that in our case, even if it is not relevant for the subsequent analysis, one might
reasonably assume that k0 < 1 and k1 > 1; specifically, if k0+k1 = 2 one gets E [z | y∗] = y∗.
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1. Recall that by (24) V (z) is increasing in its argument and Propo-
sition 1, roughly speaking, essentially states that the interval [α, α]
shrinks as V (z) increases (specifically, as x (z) increases). Therefore,
since z ≥ k0y∗, [α, α] is the largest interval for the class y∗ whenever
α ≡ α [V (k0y∗)] and α ≡ α [V (k0y∗)]. Thus, all taxpayers lying out-
side, i.e. characterized by α < α [V (k0y∗)] or α > α [V (k0y∗)], will
reject the cutoff and pay
E [T (α, y∗)] = ty∗ + p(1 + s)t(w − y∗) (26)
to the Tax Administration for all admissible values of the signal k0y∗ ≤
z ≤ k1y∗.
2. If α [V (k0y∗)] ≤ α ≤ α [V (k0y∗)], then there exist values z ≥ k0y∗
such that the cutoff will be paid. Specifically, the cutoff will be paid
for all signals z such that α [V (z)] ≤ α ≤ α [V (z)]. By monotonicity
of the interval [α, α] with respect to z, there will be some zα,y∗ such
that either α = α [V (zα,y∗)] or α = α [V (zα,y∗)], and the taxpayer
(characterized by risk coefficient α) will accept the cutoff offer whenever
k0y∗ ≤ z ≤ zα,y∗ , while she will reject it for all values zα,y∗ < z ≤ k1y∗.
Hence, the expected payment is given by
E [T (α, y∗)] =
zα,y∗Z
k0y∗
V (z)h(z | y∗)dz (27)
+
k1 − zα,y∗
k1 − k0
[ty∗ + p(1 + s)t(w − y∗)] .
Thus, case 1 refers to taxpayers whose risk aversion coefficient implies the
refusal of the cutoff even when the signal z is at its lowest level k0y∗ and
the requested threshold tax is small. They report income as usual and pay
taxes and fines that are proportional to their true income according to (25)
in Proposition 4. Case 2 refers to taxpayers who instead are ready to accept
the cutoff when the signal is k0y∗ and might confirm this choice also in upper
classes. They shall however refuse the cutoff when the requested threshold
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tax becomes so high that they drop out from the risk aversion interval [α, α]
relevant for acceptance. Thus, for the latter group, the expected payment
depends also on the probability (k1 − zα,y∗) (k1 − k0)−1 of paying taxes and
expected fines according to general rules.
Proposition 5 Let the (proportional) class system be defined as in Section
5, with the threshold tax defined, according to (24), as
V (z) =
µ
t+
x0
y∗0
¶
z. (28)
Consider all taxpayers with risk coefficient α and optimal reported income
y∗ ≥ y∗0 . Assume that the signal z associated to y∗ is uniformly distributed
over the interval [k0y∗, k1y∗] with density h(z | y∗) = [(k1 − k0) y∗]−1, 0 ≤
k0 < k1. Then, for each fixed α, the expected total payment of such taxpayers
is proportional to y∗, and thus, thanks to (7), to the true income w.
Proof. Proportionality is obviously verified for the first case, i.e. when
α < α [V (k0y∗)] or α > α [V (k0y∗)] and the expected payment is (26).
To see that also in the second case proportionality holds, note that, by
Proposition 3 since the class system is proportional, with no loss of generality
the value zα,y∗ may be written in product form: zα,y∗ = zαy∗. Hence, by
using (28), the integral in (27) is
zαy∗Z
k0y∗
V (z)h(z | y∗)dz = 1
2
¡
z2α − k20
¢
(t+ x0/y∗0)
k1 − k0
y∗,
and the proof is complete.
The last result states that, under the assumption of uniform distribution
for the signals z supported on intervals which are spreading as y∗ increases,
the mild vertical equity of our tax system is being preserved also in a more
general framework including classes and asymmetric information. Since the
signal distribution is the same at each y∗ level, all taxpayers run the same
proportional risk of gaining or losing as a consequence of mistakes in the class
assignment.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that a cutoff policy cum taxpayers’ classes, when
taxpayers are risk averse and have a CRRA utility functions, is compatible
in a mild sense with vertical equity: taxpayers’ expected payments are pro-
portional to true income, for each given value of the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. Horizontal equity, however, is violated, as taxpayers with equal
income (and different risk aversion) pay different amounts. When the CRRA
utility function is considered, these features would characterize also a propor-
tional tax system without a cutoff policy. However, there are specific equity
problems introduced by the cutoff. Within each class, only some taxpayers
accept paying the threshold tax. While they make larger payments than those
who refuse the cutoff, they also benefit from the possibility of insuring against
the risk of audits. Those who refuse the cutoff are thus in a less favorable
position, as they do not receive a suitable insurance offer. From the efficiency
point of view, taxpayers who pay the threshold tax provide an extra source of
income for the government, while less resources are needed for running audits.
Summing-up, the policy involves a specific equity-efficiency trade-off.
The literature about the cutoff rule under risk neutrality has been largely
concerned with the regressive bias of this policy and with the ways of cor-
recting it, in particular through the introduction of taxpayers’ classes. In our
model the regressive bias need not exist as the taxpayers who accept paying
the threshold tax might have intermediate characteristics in terms of income
and relative risk aversion.
Unlike in models that assume risk neutrality, the cutoff policy when tax-
payers are risk averse does not necessarily imply a full separation of types
(relatively poor taxpayers who report as usual and relatively rich ones who
pay the threshold tax). Indeed, we have highlighted cases in which also rel-
atively rich taxpayers refuse the cutoff. Self revelation of types through the
cutoff policy, as is well known, is problematic, as it implies the temptation for
the Tax Administration of reneging its promises ex post. This problem does
not arise in our model.
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Admittedly, our paper is limited in scope, as we do not discuss how to
shape an optimal cutoff policy, but only which reactions would arise given
that a simple one is used. Our specific contribution pertains to determining
the pattern of the reaction of taxpayers under the widely used CRRA utility
function. Results could be used for describing the cutoff policy as part of
a standard welfare maximization problem with taxation. This more general
approach, which could provide further insight for assessing the equity and
efficiency implications of the cutoff policy under risk aversion, is left for future
research.
Appendix: Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 will be accomplished through several steps. First
we need two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 1 ψ(α) < φ(α) for all 0 < α < 1.
Proof. Since r < 1 and assumption A.2 implies B < A,
(A−Br)1−α <
³
A−Br 1α
´1−α
= φ(α) (29)
for all 0 < α < 1. Since (A−Br)1−α is strictly convex for all α > 0, by the
superdifferentiability property the following is true:
ψ(α) = 1− ln(A−Br)(α− 1) < (A−Br)1−α
for all 0 < α < 1, which, coupled with (29), proves the assert.
Lemma 2 Under A.1, A.2 and A.3, the function φ(α) =
³
A−Br 1α
´1−α
is
strictly convex for α ≥ 1, while the function ϕ(α) = −p
³
r
1
α
´1−α
is strictly
concave for 0 < α ≤ − (1/2) ln r and is strictly convex for α ≥ − (1/2) ln r.
Proof. A tedious direct computation of the second derivatives of both φ
and ϕ gives the result.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i). Since equality in A.3 is equivalent
to − (1/2) ln r = 1, by Lemma 2 function l(α) = ψ(α) + ϕ(α)− (1− p) turns
out to be strictly concave over (0, 1) and strictly convex over [1,+∞). This
is true since l is the sum of a constant, and functions ψ and ϕ, which are
linear and strictly concave respectively over (0, 1), and both strictly convex
over [1,+∞). In other words, l has a unique flex-point at α = 1. Moreover,
since l(1) = 0, S is non-empty and has the form S = [α, α] if and only if its
derivative is strictly negative in α = 1, that is,
l0(1) = − ln(A−Br) + p ln r < 0
which, after some algebra, is the same as condition (17). Note also that
α < +∞ since l(α)→ +∞ as α→ +∞.
Part (ii). Strict inequality in A.3 is equivalent to
− ln r
2
> 1. (30)
To simplify notation, let c = − (1/2) ln r > 1. In this case we extend the
argument above by constructing a function h(α) that is as similar to l as
possible but is better shaped than l over the interval (1, c) where the required
convexity property of l cannot be verified directly. Define
χ(α) = 1 +
φ (c)− 1
c− 1 (α− 1)
and
h(α) =
(
l(α) for 0 < α ≤ 1 and α ≥ c
χ(α) + ϕ(α)− (1− p) for 1 < α < c.
As in the construction of function l, where we substituted the badly shaped
function φ with a linear one, ψ, over (0, 1), function h constitutes an improve-
ment of function l again by linearizing φ, which, by Lemma 2, is convex for
all α ≥ 1. As a result, h turns out to be strictly concave over (1, c), being the
sum of a constant, a linear and a concave function.
Function h(α) turns out to be the same as l(α) outside the interval (1, c),
where the same argument of Part (i) applies. Specifically, h is strictly concave
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over (0, 1) and l(α) ≥ 0 has a non-empty interval [α, 1) as the solution as long
as l0−(1) = l
0(1) < 0; while h is strictly convex over (c,+∞). Inside interval
(1, c), we have seen that h(α) = χ(α) + ϕ(α) − (1 − p) is strictly concave.
Moreover, since h is obtained by replacing the strictly convex function φ with
the segment joining two points of its graph, h(α) > l(α) holds true for all
α ∈ (1, c), while h(1) = l(1) and h (c) = l (c). Note that h is not differentiable
at points α = 1 and α = c, where is only left and right-differentiable, while
l0(1) exists.
Hence, h0+(1) ≤ 0 =⇒ h(α) < 0 =⇒ l(α) < 0 for all α ∈ (1, c]. Fur-
thermore, l(c) < 0 plus its convexity over (c,+∞) implies l(α) ≤ 0 for all
α ∈ [c, α], where c < α < +∞. To conclude, h0+(1) ≤ 0 =⇒ l(α) ≤ 0 for all
α ∈ (1, α], while, on the other side, h0+(1) ≤ 0 =⇒ l0+(1) = l0(1) < 0, thus also
establishing the non-emptiness of the interval [α, 1). A direct computation
shows that condition h0+(1) ≤ 0 is equivalent to condition (18), and the proof
is complete. Note that again, under our construction, we obtain a function h
with a unique flex point at α = c.
Part (iii). By construction, ψ0(α) = φ0(1) = − ln(A−Br) over (0, 1]. By
Lemma 2,
φ0(α) ≥ φ0(1) = − ln(A−Br) ∀α ≥ 1 and
ϕ0 (α) ≥ ϕ0
µ
− ln r
2
¶
=
4e−2p
r ln r
∀α > 0.
Therefore,
l0 (α) ≥ φ0(1) + ϕ0
µ
− ln r
2
¶
= − ln(A−Br) + 4e
−2p
r ln r
and l0 (α) > 0 if − ln(A−Br) +
¡
4e−2p
¢
(r ln r)−1 > 0, which is equivalent to
(19); hence, (19) =⇒ l0 (α) > 0 for all α > 0. Since l(1) = 0, l0 > 0 means
that l “crosses” level zero increasingly at α = 1, and system (16) has empty
solution set, as was to be shown.
The proof showed how A.3 forces the unique flex-point of function ϕ to lie
to the right of α = 1. Clearly, it is possible to reproduce a similar technique
for the case r > e−2.
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Proof of Proposition 2. In order to have α > 0 the following condition
on function f(α) defined in (15) must hold:
lim
α→0+
f(α) = A− (1− p) < 0,
that is, function f(α) must have a negative intercept. By substituting A as
in (11), this proves equivalent to:
x >
p (1 + s) (1− t) ty∗
(1 + s) t− 1
However, the above inequality, to be meaningful, requires a nonempty solution
set S, that is, (18) of Proposition 1 must be met as well. Thus, we need to
find values for the tax rate t such that
p (1 + s) (1− t) ty∗
(1 + s) t− 1 < x,
where x is defined in (18).
By plugging x as in (18) into the above inequality, we get
g (1 + s) t > 1− p
¡
1− e−2
¢
−
·
1 + p (ln r)
µ
ln r
2
+ 1
¶¸ 2
2+ln r
(31)
where
g = 1− p−
·
1 + p (ln r)
µ
ln r
2
+ 1
¶¸ 2
2+ln r
.
To study the sign of g, it is convenient to rewrite it in terms of parameters r
and s rather than p and r by using (13), which yields
p =
r
s+ r
.
Graphical inspection of the function
g (r, s) = 1− r
s+ r
−
·
1 +
r (ln r)
s+ r
µ
ln r
2
+ 1
¶¸ 2
2+ln r
shows14 that g (r, s) > 0 for 0 < r < e−2 and s ≥ 1. Thus, dividing by
g ≡ g (r, s) > 0 in (31), yields (20).
14Clearly, inequality g (r, s) > 0 does not allow for a closed form solution, thus we have
checked it directly by plotting the graph of g (r, s) through Maple 7 for the relevant values
of parameters r and s.
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Figure 1: illustration of Proposition 1: a) plot of the function h (approximat-
ing the function f) for x = 50: the solution set is the interval [0.36,5.64]; b)
plot of the approximating function l for x = 250: a case of empty solution set.
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